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THE POWER OF THE MUNICIPALITY TO OBSTRUCT
ABANDON OR VACATE A PUBLIC WAY IN KENTUCKY.
INTRODUCTION
Dillion in his works on Municipal Corporations1 says,
"Municipal Corporations in this country sustain most important
relations to streets and highways within their limits. By statute
or by charter they are usually authorized to open, establish,
alter and vacate streets. . . . The authorities of these cor-
porations are usually vested with the capacity to acquire prop-
erty for streets for the public use and convenience." Easements
in a public way may be acquired in one of several modes: (1)
by prescription, (2) by dedication, (3) by exercise of right of
eminent domain. Streets when dedicated and accepted by the
corporation, or acquired by purchase or otherwise are usually
placed under the control of the corporation with the power to
improve, grade, pave, regulate, etc. In some states there are
statutes that the fee in the streets shall be in the municipality in
trust for the public, while in other states the fee is considered to
be in the adjoining proprietor, the public only having an ease-
ment (so called) therein. The latter is the law in Kentucky.
It is the purpose of this article to deal with some phases of
the law relating to the obstruction and abandonment of streets
and the grant of franchises for their use. Before doing so, how-
ever, it is necessary to determine what is meant by public streets
or public ways and to note the constitutional provisions affecting
them.
STREETS AND Hir nwAxs DISvGuinmD
In the use of the term "public way," we mean, so far as
municipal corporations are concerned, the publo streets. A
street is defined as a public highway within a municipality,
Sachs v. Sioux City, 109 Iowa 224. The urban character of
streets is sufficient, in the judicial construction of statutory pro-
visions, to limit the term "street" to the public highway of in-
corporated municipalities.2 but when a question arises whether
a statutory provision applying to its term simply to "highways"
I Section 1120 (5th Ed.).
2 .Duval County v. Jacksonville, 36 Flo. 196.
KENTucKY LAw Jou1-NA
extends to include the "streets" on an incorporated municipal-
ity much greater difficulty is experienced.
"The practice has grown up in the Legislature of some of
the states of referring to rural ways as 'highways' as dis-
tinguished from 'street,' the thoroughfares of cities, towns
and villages ;3 but this practice is by no means uniformly adopted
and followed. 4 When, therefore, the courts have been obliged
to construe the term 'highway' for determining its applicability
to the 'streets' of a city, town or village, they have been com-
pelled to fall 'back upon a consideration of the nature of the
statutory enactment, the evil sought to be remedied, the public
benefit to be achieved, and other circumstances which may throw
light upon the legislative intent." 5
CONSTTUTIONAL PROVISIONS
There are two important constitutional provisions in Ken-
tucky which deal with the public control of the streets of cities
and towns. It has been held that both of these sections must be
read together,0 and sucb reading indicates the safeguards thrown
by the Constitution about the use of streets for the benefit of the
public. These sections are:
Section 163 of the Kentucky Constitution provides:
"No street railway, gas, water, steam, steam heating, telephone or
electric light company, within a city or town, shall be permitted or
authorized to construct its tracks, lay its pipes or mains, or erect its
poles, parts or other apparatus along, under or across tle streets, alleys
or public grounds of a city or town without the consent of the proper
legislative bodies or boards of such city or town first being obtained;
but when charters have heretofore been granted, conferring such rights,
and work has in good faith been begun thereunder, -the provisions of
this section shall not apply.7
Section 164 of the Kentucky Constitution provides:
"No county, city, town, taxing district or other municipality shall
be authorized or permitted to grant any franchise or privilege or make
any contract in reference thereto for a term exceeding twenty years.
Before granting such a franchise or privilege for a term of years,
such municipality shall first, after due advertisement, receive bids there-
for publicly, and award the same .to the highest and best bidder; but it
3 Streets and alleys distinguished, Btate v. Harrison, 162 Ind. 542.
See also Pace v. Iona, 90 Mich. 104.
"Duffy v. New Orleans, 49 La. An. 114.
'Dillion on Municipal Corporations, fifth edition, section 1120.
0 C. T. & T. Co. v. City, 151 Kentucky 241.
7L. d N. R. R. Co. v. Bowling Green, 110 Kentucky 700.
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shall have the right to reject any and all bids. This section shall not
apply to a trunk railway."
OBSTRUCTION
In the case of Dudley v. Trustees of Frankfort,"' the court
said, "Though the trustees of Frankfort have the right to keep
the streets and alleys open, they have not, under the pretext of
removing obstructions from the street, the right to tear down the
inclosure and take possession for public use of the lands and lots
of citizens." See also Trustees of Augusta v. Perkins."
In 1874 Judge Lindsey in delivering the opinion of the court
in the case of Crosby & Et. v. Owensboro & Russellvile R. R.
Co.,' 2 said, "The right of the authorities of the city, within Leg-
islative warrant, to permit the construction and operation
through its streets of railroads upon which trains of cars pro-
pelled by steam may be operated is not now an open question
in this state."'
13
It was held in the case of Clark v. Commonwealth that, "A
legislative act authorizing the county to lay off such public
roads within the county as are deemed proper, does not give
authority to lay off or establish streets in an incorporated town
(against the will of the municipality) because, say these decis-
ions, a highway is not a street, either technically or in common
parlance.''14 It has also been decided that a statute in relation
to public highways does not apply to incorporated towns or
cities.'"15
The court held in the case of Rowe v. Reneer,16 that a town
ordinance prohibiting the standing of a team in the public street
unattended and unhitched was not invalid but was reasonable
under police regulations, the court saying, "The safety and the
convenience of travel in congested and obstructed streets demand
reasonable regulations." From this we gather that the city may
3Keith v. Johnson, 109 Ky. 421.
'Diebold v. Kentucky Traction Co., 117 Ky. 246.
"12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 610.
13 B. Mon. (Ky.) 427.
110 Bush 288.
"Lexington & Ohio R. B. Co. v. Applegatem, 8 Dana (Ky.) 289;
Wolfe v. Cov. & Lex. R. R. Co., 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 763, 9 Bush 264.
1"Cowan's Case, 1 Overton (Tenn.) 311; Lafayette v. Jenners, 10
Ind. 74.
"Board of Council of Danville v. Fiscal Court of Boyle, 106 Ky. 608.
"99 S. W. (Ky.) 250.
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prevent even a temporary obstruction so long as it is within
reason. See also Wells v. Town of Mt. Olivet17
Chief Justice Hobson said in the case of Labry v. Gilmour,'8
(A case testing the power of a city to lease a street) that author-
ities of a municipal corporation held the public ways of the
street in trust for the use of the public and cannot sell or lease
them for private use. A lease by the city to an individual of the
street or public way of the city for private use confers no au-
thority upon the lessee to appropriate them to his use. "19
In a very recent case, Alsip v. Hodge.20 the Court of Ap-
peals decided that when one interested in the removal of obstric-
tions of a public street on the ground of a public nuisance must
show ownership of property in the particular block; the court
saying: "Where the nuisance complained of is alleged to be the
obstruction of a street or alley in the limits of a city whose area
is laid off in city blocks bounded by streets, this court has uni-
formly held that none, save those owning lots in the particular
block in question can be said to suffer any injury distinct from
that suffered by the general public." 21
A very common obstruction in the streets-and one that has
caused much litigation-is that caused by property owners using
the public way, with municipal authority, to place building
material thereon in building on or improving the abutting prop-
erty. In the case of De Garmo v. 7 ogt and City of LouisvIle, 22
the court held that the city might give a permit to one for the
use of the street, placing building material thereon, in building
or repairing the premises. In City of Georgetown v. Goff, 23 the
rule is thus laid down: "It is the duty of the city when obstruc-
tions are placed in the streets, to use such means as are reason-
ably necessary to warn those using the streets of the presence of
the obstruction; and it is a question of fact for the jury, under
the particular facts of each case, to determine whether or not
the means used for this purpose were reasonably sufficient." The
case of Maxwell v. Fayette National Bank, 2 4 says that the one
p126 Ky. 131.
121 Ky. 367.
" 1 A. K. Mar. 9, 28 Cyc. 850, 864.
'0283 S. W. (Ky.) 392.
21143 Ky. 162.
1151 Ky. 857.
21136 Ky. 622.
2186 Ky. 625.
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seeking a remedy must show a special or peculiar injury to be en-
titled to injunctive relief or abate a nuisance.
The fourth held in the case of the City of Louisville v.
Vaughn,2 5 that a municipal corporation is charged with notice
of presence of obstruction in the streets when it allows wagons
to remain in the streets overnight, and is liable to a traveler
injured when stumbling over such obstructions. A case that
goes much further is City of Paducab v. Simmins,2 6 where the
city was charged with notice and held liable for damages to the
injury of one tripping over a wire which was hidden in the grass
between the sidewalk and the street.
Perhaps the most common obstruction of the public way
comes from closing the way to repair. In the case of Tigtmier
v. City of Covi'ngton the court, speaking through Judge Sampson,
said, "A municipality has power and authority while building
or rebuilding a street or any part thereof to blockade and close
the same to travel.''27 From a review of all the cases cited, it
appears that the municipality may obstruct the public way, di-
vert traffic in such a way as to work hardships upon individuals
without liability so long as it is not unreasonable and arbi-
trary."2
8
VACATION OR ABANDONMktENT
As early as 1830 the Kentucky legislature incorporated the
Lexington & Ohio Railroad with authority to construct a road
from Lexington to "Some one or more points on the Ohio
river." It was held in a case testing the authority of the city
of Louisville to extend the railroad over the city streets that,
"'An ordinary public way may be discontinued 'or applied to
some other purpose than that to which it was first established
without any legal liability or pecuniary compensation to the
local public because they have no right or legal interest that is
mot common to all." L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Applegate.2 9 . How-
ever, the court in the same opinion put this qualification upon
the preceding quotation by saying, "If the construction of this
railroad and the use made by it were not inconsistent with those
" 180 Ky. 681.
"144 Ky. 640.
183 Ky. 312.
138 Ky. 749.
"8 Dana (Ky.) 289.
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public objects, or with the private rights, the Mayor of the city
of Louisville had an unquestionable right to authorize such con-
struction and use of it without any ad quod damumn." All of
-which apparently means simply this, that the municipality has a
wide discretion in saying what is a proper use of its public ways.
As a general proposition we find that a municipality has the
power to vacate or abandon existing streets and avenues; such
power generally being discretionary with the municipality,30 and
such discretion will not be interfered with except when abused 31-
or the act is fraudulent. The procedure to vacate must be in
strict compliance with the statutory provisions relating thereto.3s
In the case of Bohemiser v. Bohemiser, 90 Ky. 48, the court held
an act of the legislature closing an alley unconstitutional. The
court said, "If the right of ingress and egress is taken, wholly
or partially, so as to work an injury, it is taking private prop-
erty without first making compensation. "33 Of course it follows
that if the legislature cannot close a street by an act it cannot
delegate it to the municipality; however, this is a case of getting
to and from abutting property over a way that, tho unim-
proved, has been in use for some time but not formally dedicated.
The particular facts of the case save it, perhaps.3
4
Doubtless the clearest and most direct case and most elab-
orate opinion on the point is that of Henderson v. City of Lex-
ington,35 Numerous authorities are cited and commented upon
in this case. The case holds: (1) The closing of an alley or
street is within section 13 of the Kentucky Constitution; (2) the
closing must be necessary for a public purpose; (3) when the
private corporation desires to take private property it must af-
firmatively show that the property is needed for its use in the
performance to its duties to the public; (4) but when the munici-
pal corporation desire sand undertakes to exercise the power of
eminent domain, it will be presumed that it is in the interest of
the public and necessary for public use, and the burden of show-
ing the contrary will be upon those objecting to the proceedings-
so 49 At. 9.
380 Pac. 205.
80 N. W. 1101.
"89 Ky. 2.
-97 Ky. 30.
132 Ky. 390.
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In a very recent case, Davis v. City of Paducak,3 6 the city
instituted action to close a street. Davis resisted this and filed
-his petition to recover damages to his property occasioned by thG
closing of the street; he was a non-abutting property owner. The
Court of Appeals in affirming the lower court in dismissing the
petition said, "Davis may have occasion to use this street oftener
than others because of its proximity to his property, and for that
reason he may suffer more inconvenience than others, but that is
a difference in degree, and not in kind. A line must be drawn
some where, and in this State it has been drawn, and owners of
non-abutting property are not necessary parties to the action to
close a street and cannot recover damages for its closing.'' 37 A
review of the authorities will convince one that a municipality
may vacate, abandon or close a public way whenever there is a
reasonable ground for public use for so doing, and that the
courts are inclined to give them a wide range in their discretion
in such cases. All the cases hold that the statutes with refer-
ence thereto must be strictly complied with.3 8 The courts have
in all cases attempted to see that there was a public purpose 3 9
In the case of the City of Louisville v. Brannon,40 the city at-
tempted to vacate a street for a pecuniary benefit. In the opinion
the court remarked, "A mere money consideration, to be paid the
government, state or municaplity is not a public use for which
private property may be taken from one citizen and given to
another. "1
4 1
FRANCISES
There remains to be considered that large class of rights in
p-ublic streets which are granted in furtherance of public pur-
poses, but which, involving as they do the right to use the streets
in various ways, give rise to a series of questions. That the use
,of the streets in the construction of sewers, water lines, telegraph
and telephone lines, gas lines and for general utility purposes
is an increased burden and makes travel more dangerous is very
evident (though the courts may not agree). The basis of the
- 281 S. W. (Ky.) 158.
, Lewis on Eminent Domain, 3rd Edit., See. 198-199.
' See Ky. Statutes, See. 3094, 3290, 3449 and 3562.
9 Martin v. City of Louisvile, 97 Ky. 30.
'99 Ky. 74.
'But see and compare, 138 Ky. 749.
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opposite view is that such modern conveniences as the telephone
and telegraph save the roads of travel; this, of course, cannot be
disputed, but the fact remains that the increased burden and
hazard is there for those who do use the way-those that cannot
afford the modern means of communication. The courts have-
in every way possible-given a liberal construction to the
furtherance of such conveniences and as a general proposition
they take the position that these modern appliances simply take
the place of the early means of communication and utility. For
convenience these rights are described as franchises. A fran-
chise has been described as a particular privilege which does not
belong to the individual or corporation as of right, but is con-
ferred by a sovereign or government upon, and vested in indi-
viduals or corporations. Blackstone defines it as, "A royal priv-
ilege or branch of the king's prerogative subsisting in the hands
of a subject.''42
Dillion says, "The essential element of a franchise is that
it should be a privilege, right or power which the individual
cannot exercise as of right and which depends for its lawful
existence upon a grant from the government.' '4  This grant
must come from the state to the municipality. Section 164 44
of the Constitution of Kentucky forbids the franting of a fran-
chise for longer than twenty years by a municipality.4 5 In the
case of City of Somerset v. Smith,46 this was definitely estab-
lished; however, in Cumberland Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany v. Louisville,4 7 the court held that. under the Constitution
existing in 1886, the right to use the city street for telephone pur-
poses, acquired under perpetual charter of the telephone com-
pany, empowering it, with and by the consent of the city council,
to construct and maintain a telephone system in the city of Lou-
isville was not revocable by the city at, will.
48
A case of more recent date, and one that has much more
force and weight by reason of the facts upon which it is placed,
Cumberland Telephone and Telegraph, Company v. City of Cal.
11 BI. Com. 37.
41 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 519.
" Supra, page 3.
Keith v. Johnson, 109 Ky. 421.
4105 Ky. 678.
- 224 U. S. 649.
3 Accord; Citg of Newport v. Newport Light Co., 84 Ky. 166.
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houn,49 holds that if a public service corporation obtains a fran-
chise 50 except as provided in the Constitution (Section 164) it
is a trespasser and cannot invoke in its favor any of the laws en-
acted for the protection or benefit of corporations that have ob-
served the law.
The abuse of the franchise granted is one of grave concern.
It is evident that the courts look to all the circumstances closely
with a view to determining if the privilege has in fact been
abused. From the line of authorities cited in the preceding case,
it is evident that any encroachment or abuse of the franchise
privilege will not be tolerated in Kentucky.
J. B. JOHNSON.
Attorney at Law.
Williamsburg, Kentucky.
-151 Ky. 241.
0 See also East Tenn. Co. v. City of R1ussel~ville, 106 Ky. 667; E. 2?.
T. d Tel. Co. v. City of Frankfort, 141 Ky. 588.
